Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission

INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION

Russian Federation, State Duma Elections – 4 December 2011

STATEMENT OF PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Moscow, 5 December 2011

This Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions is the result of a common endeavour involving the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA) and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE).

Petros Efthymiou (Greece), Head of the OSCE PA Delegation, was appointed by the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office as Special Co-ordinator to lead the short term observer mission. Tiny Kox (Netherlands) headed the PACE delegation. Heidi Tagliavini (Switzerland) is the Head of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission (EOM).

This assessment was made to determine whether these elections complied with OSCE commitments and Council of Europe standards, as well as with national legislation. In many regions of the country, regional and local elections were held concurrently with the parliamentary elections and were observed only to the extent that they may have impacted the conduct of the latter. This statement of preliminary findings and conclusions is delivered prior to the completion of the electoral process. The final assessment of the elections will depend, in part, on the conduct of the remaining stages of the election process; in particular, the tabulation and announcement of results, and the handling of possible post-election day complaints and appeals. The OSCE/ODIHR will issue a comprehensive final report, including recommendations for potential improvements, some eight weeks after the completion of the election process. The OSCE PA will present its report at its 2012 winter meeting. The PACE delegation will present its report at January 2012 part-session.

PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

The preparations for the 4 December State Duma elections were technically welladministered across a vast territory, but the elections were marked by the convergence of the State and the governing party. Despite the lack of a level playing field during the electoral process, voters took advantage of their right to express their choice. Although seven parties ran, the prior denial of registration to certain political parties narrowed political competition. The contest was also slanted in favour of the ruling party as evidenced by the lack of independence of the election administration, the partiality of most media, and the undue interference of state authorities at different levels. This all did not provide the necessary conditions for fair electoral competition. The legal framework, however, was improved in some respects and televised debates provided one level platform for contestants.

The legal framework is comprehensive and provides an adequate basis for the conduct of elections. However, structurally, the legal framework is overly complex and open to interpretation, which led to its inconsistent application by various stakeholders, often in favour of one party over the others. Laws guaranteeing the right of assembly were in some cases applied restrictively, undermining contestants’ rights. Numerous amendments to the legal framework were adopted since the last elections. A number of changes improved certain elements of the electoral process, although the recent reduction of the parliamentary threshold to five per cent did not apply in these elections.

The Central Election Commission (CEC) adopted detailed instructions to facilitate preparations for the elections. It held regular sessions and took most decisions unanimously, without debate. The manner in which the CEC dealt with complaints undermined contestants’ rights to effective and timely redress. Representatives of most political parties expressed a high degree of distrust in the impartiality of election commissions at all levels and questioned their independence from various state administration bodies.

The denial by the Ministry of Justice of registration to a number of political parties reduced the choices available to voters. In one case, the European Court of Human Rights recently ruled that the state’s disbanding of one party was disproportionate and constituted an unlawful interference in the party’s internal functioning.

Once and future President

Financial Times

Twenty years after the Soviet collapse, with all the hopes that inspired that Russia might embrace democracy, it comes down to this. A Russian electorate consisting of one person has decided that Vladimir Putin will return as president next year.

Though Mr Putin’s popularity is not what it once was, there is little doubt this will come to pass. Russia’s tightly controlled political system will not allow any credible challenger to stand against him next March. Indeed, no such challenger has been given the chance to emerge in recent years. All the state’s resources will ensure that Mr Putin returns for what, under new electoral rules, could be 12 more years.

It is wrong to overstate the significance of this decision. Mr Putin has, after all, remained Russia’s paramount leader throughout the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev – which has been disappointingly short on achievements. His return to what is constitutionally the top job preserves at least one small shred of democracy, in that Mr Putin is still more popular than his protégé.

Yet a new Putin presidency is nonetheless a retrograde and risky step. Mr Medvedev has firmly embraced, at least verbally, the modernising political and economic agenda that Russia sorely needs. While he failed to build his own political team or support base – crucial omissions – he associated himself with advisers of like mind. A second term as president could have provided the opportunity finally to consolidate his position and start delivering reforms, especially if Mr Putin’s influence had begun to fade. The former president’s lingering authority has always stemmed in part from the possibility of his return.

Mr Putin has, by contrast, shown little appetite for modernising reforms, or much understanding of their urgency. His instincts are cautious, conservative. But the stability he promised in the first years of his presidency after the chaotic post-Soviet transition of the 1990s has turned, over time, into a straitjacket that is hampering Russia’s development.

If it is to return to the 5 per cent-plus annual growth it needs to catch up with the world’s advanced economies, Russia must allow more competition of ideas and policies, and reduce the state’s distorting role in the economy. It must tackle the corruption that is corroding the Russian system from within. It has to replace “managed” democracy with the institutions of genuine pluralism. Mr Putin may yet surprise the doubters by moving in this direction. But that would mean dismantling central elements of the very system he put in place in his previous eight-year presidency.

Mr Putin’s return will complicate Russia’s relations with the west, too. President Barack Obama’s “reset” brought results in part because Washington found it easier to deal with Mr Medvedev in the front-of-house role, even if Mr Putin was managing the back office. Germany’s Angela Merkel has similarly cultivated the current Russian president, but is on frostier terms with Mr Putin.

If Mr Putin does shrink from reform at home, however, he risks sowing the seeds of his own downfall. Stirrings of disillusionment are starting to show up in pollsters’ research. These may not be strong enough to prevent the Kremlin from managing the transition of power. But unaddressed they are likely to multiply.

A whole generation of Russians has reached voting age that was not born when communism collapsed. This generation gets its news not from Kremlin-controlled television but from an internet which, unlike China, Russia has never censored. Russia’s next president should take account of such shifts. Otherwise, like Arab counterparts, he could yet discover the power of social networks – and of the street.

Billionaire Condemns Party He Led as a Kremlin ‘Puppet’

By Ellen Barry and Andrew E. Kramer

The New York Times

MOSCOW — It has been a long time since a Russian billionaire attacked the political system. In the past, it has not ended well.  

On Thursday, Mikhail Prokhorov described Russia's party system as an elaborate sham orchestrated by a “puppet master” within the Kremlin walls. By the time he finished, Mr. Prokhorov seemed to have gambled with the most valuable asset a Russian businessman can have — good relations with the Kremlin and its most important occupant, Prime Minister Vladimir V. Putin. 

Mr. Prokhorov’s comments were prompted by the public meltdown of Right Cause, a pro-business party that was restarted this spring in hopes of winning the loyalty of disgruntled elites. The party had all the hallmarks of “pocket opposition” — Kremlin-sponsored projects that cast themselves as antigovernment but steer clear of challenging Russia’s leaders. 

Until now, Mr. Prokhorov had denied that Right Cause was operating in this way. But the party deteriorated into rancor this week, when party members voted to oust Mr. Prokhorov over his staffing decisions and leadership style. 

Mr. Prokhorov blamed micromanagement from the Kremlin for the debacle. He reserved his harshest words for Vladislav Y. Surkov, the deputy head of the presidential administration.

“I am not willing to take part in this farce,” he told an auditorium full of reporters, calling on his supporters to “leave this puppet Kremlin party.” 

“In this country there is a puppet master who long ago privatized the political system, who has long misinformed the Russian leadership about what is going on in the political system, puts pressure on the media, and tries to manipulate citizens’ opinions,” he said. “This puppet master is named Vladislav Surkov.”

There are precedents for this kind of confrontation. Mikhail B. Khodorkovsky, an oil tycoon who was financing a true opposition party, is serving a 13-year sentence for embezzlement. Vladimir A. Gusinsky and Boris A. Berezovsky, whose media outlets criticized the government, fled the country to avoid prosecution. 

She is Number 3!

About halfway through last week's controversial elections in two St. Petersburg municipalities, the state television channel Rossiya showed up to election precinct No. 1348 to film the proceedings. The young TV reporter buttonholed a tall young man with a dim face and a pink shirt -- an election observer sent by the ruling party, United Russia. 

"So," said the reporter. "We just need you to stand here and say everything is going well." 

"Everything is going well," said the election observer. "We are very pleased with the high turnout." 

In fact, everything was going swimmingly, both for the observer and his candidate, the former governor of St. Petersburg, Valentina Matviyenko. As the other United Russia observers chastised reporters for talking and tried to keep photographers away from the voting booth, Matviyenko was just a few hours away from winning representation to the municipal council in a landslide. 

Russian Village’s Self-Defense Underlines Failures of Police

By Seth Mydans

SAGRA, Russia — When Sergei the Gypsy wanted to show who was boss in this tiny settlement on the edge of the Ural Mountains, he gathered a posse of armed men and drove down a narrow road through the night, illuminating the forest with his headlights.

“They are coming to kill us,” one of the villagers shouted, and Viktor Gorodilov, who was in his bathhouse, threw on some clothes and joined a small group of men with shotguns, pitchforks, chains and knives to guard the road. “We just had three guns, including me,” said Mr. Gorodilov, 56. “But they didn’t expect any resistance, and we had them in our hands.” 

Alexander Lebedev has announced he is quitting business in Russia

Alexander Lebedev

   Lebedev said security service pressure on his banking business had become so great it was impossible to continue. Last November, the National Reserve Bank headquarters in Moscow were raided by 30 masked police officers while the billionaire, the financial backer of the opposition Novaya Gazeta newspaper, was inside the building. The announcement came one day after Lebedev released a video detailing the raid and alleged corruption by the Federal Security Service officers involved. 

   Also he has written to the head of Russia's security service offering his experience from 11 years of service with the organisation to help to expose corruption in business and the country's "power structures".

   The entrepreneur, who has been an outspoken critic of the Russian government, said a number of FSB generals had been targeting his business with claims that he held "unlawful intentions". He pointed out that similar allegations had been levelled by the FSB at Sergei Storchak, a finance minister and friend who spent 11 months in prison before the case against him fell apart in court.

   In an open letter to Alexander Bortnikov, the director of the FSB, Mr Lebedev said: "I am ready to offer my experience to help expose the corruption which pervades Russia\'s financial sphere and the country\'s power structures."

   Also he wrote on his blog, "What’s business if it only exists in a state of battle with the FSB?"

March 13 Election Results in Russia: Reaction against Modernization

         The 13th of March was the common voting day in Russia and 3208 election campaigns and local referendums were held all over the country. It’s clear now that elections were much dirtier than in October, 2010. After an increase in rates for household electricity, gas and other utilities, United Russia's popularity now at its lowest level in more than a year. However, disenchantment with United Russia suppressed turnout, but did not drive voters to support the opposition.  

          The key campaigns contested seats in regional parliaments. These took place in 12 regions, including three republics (Adygea, Dagestan, Komi), two autonomous districts (Chukotka and Khanty-Mansiisk) and seven regions: Kaliningrad, Tver, Kirov, Nizhny Novgorod, Kursk, Tambov and Orenburg. What made the current round of elections particularly important is the fact that they were the last campaign before elections for the State Duma and the subsequent presidential election.

          Voters went to the polls on Sunday amid complaints of numerous violations, including unsanctioned rallies by pro-Kremlin groups, crude measures to block election observers’ views of ballot boxes, attempts to stuff ballots for United Russia, campaigning next to polling stations, transporting of voters, intimidation of voters and others. Irregularities in the voting outside the polling stations were the most widespread. It’s extremely significant that violations became aggressive because it’s impossible now to ensure governing party’s victory by using moderate meddling as it was in former times. Also a governing party started to use a new offensive tactics of mass distribution of messages in Twitter and social networks about alleged violations by oppositional candidates and parties against United Russia and its protégées.It was done in order to gloss over information about serious and real violations against independent and oppositional parties, candidates and domestic observers.

          It’s clear that the regime is not aware of the changed situation in the world. Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, riots in Bahrain and Yemen (and in Kyrgyzstan last year) resulted in Russia only to rigging elections even dirtier and tightening the screws by the regime more impertinently.

Russia needs fair elections: Alexei Kudrin

     Deputy Head of the Government Alexei Kudrin said that Russia suffered from weak governance and rule of law, and the economy was still far too dependent on oil and gas revenues.

          

     Also he said the 2011 parliamentary and 2012 presidential elections needed to be “just and fair” and involve “all the leading political forces and representatives of society” to ensure broad support for economic reforms. It means that the Deputy Head of the Government admitted that all previous elections in Russia were unfair.

          

     As we still remember, President Dmitry Medvedev gave a pre-election speech in 2008 calling for a crackdown on corruption, stronger property rights and independent courts. It’s clear that little progress has been made on those issues.

          

     "Rather than abiding by the rules, we live as we please and rely on winks and nudges," Mr. Kudrin said. "We have a very weak system of governance."

          

     “We have some private companies which are closer to the government and the state, than other private companies — that is, they use administrative support,” he said, according to the official transcript. "Questions of mergers and acquisitions, access to resources are frequently decided in the offices of officials". It means that Finance Minister acknowledged defeat President Medvedev’s struggle against corruption as complete because economic advantages in Russia are still granted based on relationships with government officials.

          

     In a lengthy speech that touched on many aspects of the Russian economy, Mr. Kudrin reported the third annual drop in foreign direct investment— down to $12 billion to $14 billion from a high point of $27 billion.  "Even in my wildest dreams I did not imagine that we would increase military spending in such a way", Mr. Kudrin said, adding that the rise in such spending had led to an increase in overall budget spending of 1.5 percent of gross domestic product.

          

     It was an unusual criticism coming from a man who has worked closely with Vladimir Putin for more than two decades. The last time Mr. Kudrin ventured so publicly into the political realm was a year ago, when during a television interview he said he no longer associated himself with United Russia, the ruling party, which Mr. Putin leads.

The 2010 Autumn Election Campaign Review

Read in the original

          In our previous Review we analyzed results of the 2010 winter election campaign and described basic methods of falsification of election results (through voting at home, absentee voting and rewriting of final protocols of votes counting). We focused primary attention on suspicious disproportions of results of the 2007 parliamentary elections in comparison with results of previous elections, so now we know in what regions elections were rigged especially extremely.

          In the current Review we're going to briefly analyze results of the 2010 autumn election campaign and see if there was any progress. Also we’ll continue analyzing results of the 2007 parliamentary elections because it’s very important on the threshold of the next parliamentary elections in December, 2011. 

          We'll assess last elections in accordance with the Methodology of the Organization of American States. The OAS methodology to evaluate elections takes as its starting point a definition of the concept of democratic elections. The concept of democratic elections is defined in such a way that elections are considered democratic when they fulfill four basic conditions. 

The 2010 Winter Election Campaign Review: Current Condition of the Russian Electoral System

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          The purpose of this Review is systematization of disembodied data appurtenant to elections held in Russia. It’s necessary to analyze:

          1. Trends of expression of popular will during the last few years at federal, regional and municipal levels;

          2. The most common methods of use of the so-called “administrative resource”, means of falsifications of election documents and ballot rigging; 

          3. Practice of trials on cases of election law violations.

          Firstly, this will make it possible for us to understand, what difficulties will an independent candidate or a party face during an election campaign; secondly, to define a set of arrangements of counteraction to the “administrative resource” which may help an oppositional candidate or a party to stand a better chance even in conditions of direct confrontation with local authorities; and, thirdly, to substantiate the point of view that elections which don’t arouse suspicion and indignation among the advanced part of the society and international observers, will accord with interests of the federal authorities of Russia. This can be achieved only by electing truly independent candidates and electoral associations at all levels, in the first place – at the federal level.

          It’s not our goal to repeat over and over again countless numbers of stories about how one or another candidate or a party wasn’t admitted to elections, was removed from an election campaign, or how their victory was stolen by gerrymandering or rigging elections. We will only show how such facts had affected composition of elective bodies, as well as reputation of institution of elections in people’s opinion.

Eastern Siberia and the Far East of Russia as Prospective Chinese Sources of Raw Materials

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          This Review is a logical continuation of «The Macroeconomic Review 2009: Crisis as Payback Time», the previous analytical material of the Constructive Project Foundation which demonstrated the following: 

          1. Financial crisis in Russia is systemic, has intrinsic sources and relates to the world financial crisis only indirectly;

          2. Systemic crisis of the Russian Federation is not coming to an end. On the contrary, it is going deep into economy, despite a brief respite given to the Government from the G20 antirecessionary measures; 

          3. The Government has insurmountable difficulty in combating systemic crisis, and sooner or later there shall be dramatic worsening of the socio-economic situation in the country and destabilization of the decaying political system. In case of maintenance of the current political system without relaxation of the political climate there shall appear a threat of breakdown of the Russian Federation. 

          Leaving aside the issue of prevention of such further developments (it’ll be considered in subsequent works of the Foundation), now it’s necessary to consider objectively the possible geopolitical consequences of the public administration disorganization and disintegration of the Russian Federation. 

          First of all, we have to assess rationally a probable degree of Chinese interest in the East Siberian and the Far Eastern raw materials sources. It will make it possible to predict actions of Chinese leadership if the Russian Federation will be close to collapse. So, it’s necessary to answer the following questions:

Russian Macroeconomic Review 2009: Crisis as Payback Time

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          The aim of this review is to provide a graphic demonstration of true factors of economic growth in the Russian Federation in 2000-2008. It will allow us to understand, why the financial crisis in Russia begun from September, 2008, firstly, was inevitable for our country, secondly, related to the world financial crisis indirectly and, thirdly, did not even come to an end. On the contrary, the crisis is deepening now. All diagrams in this review are based on the official statistics published by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the Federal Treasury and the Federal Statistic Service. 

Operation "White Storm". What happened on Manege Square on December, 11?

Photo by Ilya Varlamov

          Over 1,000 Moscow right-wing soccer fans and nationalists blocked a key city artery in protest at a killing of Egor Sviridov, a “Spartak” soccer fan who was shot in a fight with a group of men from the North Caucasus, a longstanding conflict, Muslim region in southern Russia.

          Protesters stopped traffic on Leningrad Avenue for half an hour, climbing on cars, lighting flares and chanting nationalistic slogans. Protesters demanded a full inquiry into the murder of Egor Sviridov. Their protest puts new pressure on race relations in the Russian capital. Many ethnic Russians accuse the authorities of trying to play down hate crimes against Russians.

          The death of Egor Sviridov generated a wave of anger on Russian soccer supporters’ and nationalists’ websites. They also accused the authorities of failing to catch the killer of another soccer supporter, Yury Volkov, who was stabbed to death in Moscow in July, during a fight with a group of Chechens.

Modernization and Political System of Russia

Russian Political System

          During the presidency of Vladimir Putin all reforms of political system were justified by the need to achieve “stability” and strengthen the “vertical of power”. The real objective, as far as we can judge, was to take control of politics in the country.

 

          In September, 2009 President Medvedev publicly put forward a new task – to start modernization in Russia. Meanwhile, modernization of any political system is impossible without ensuring regular replacement of a ruling top of a state by means of elections which should be held in compliance with international election standards. Evasion of this precondition (for example, through imitation of elections) makes the modernization unrealizable, but effectively provides retention of power in hands of an irremovable leader.       

What would happen if Steve Jobs was interviewed not in San Mateo but in Moscow?

By Alexander Molotnikov

www.forbes.ru

All characters appearing in this work are fictitious.

Any resemblance to real persons, living or dead, is purely coincidental.

          Recently Apple Chief Executive Officer Steve Jobs was interviewed during the investigation of the case involving the iPhone 4 prototype. Stephen Wagstaffe, Chief Deputy District Attorney for San Mateo County, California, told that police are nearly finished with their investigation.

          In many states of the world questioning of a businessman by police means nothing more than just a questioning. Everyone does his job, and police try to catch swindlers and other criminals. However, in some countries any contact of a businessman with representatives of law-enforcement agencies often means much more and can lead to unexpected consequences. What could be in store for the distinguished Mr. Jobs, if criminal legislation of the USA would be unfriendly to businessmen, and “creative” interpretation of laws would exist among policemen?

          So, let’s start.

Russia Needs All-Volunteer Armed Force

          No wonder that the draft is regarded by many people in Russian society as something like serving deprivation of liberty for 1 year. Mass media often communicate information about outrageous facts that show disgraceful attitude towards soldiers, as if they were dumb animals. Draftees often cannot receive proper medical aid. Violence of organized groups of privates who have served more than 6 months against younger draftees became the rule. Every year not less than 3000 soldiers desert from the Russian army and a number of suicides in it is more than in the armies of the NATO countries. The situation with human rights violations in the Russian army became worse when it was allowed to call up for military service previously convicted persons. In fact, hazing in the army is the same as hazing in a prison camp. I suppose that prison hierarchy has already been adapted to army conditions in Russia. The conditions, in fact, are the same: one can be put into prison or be drafted against his own free will; both convicts and draftees are infamous and forced to do something what they don’t want to do and draftees are unpaid at that. In 3 years from reducing the period of serving in the armed forces to 12 months, it became obvious that hazing in the Russian army cannot be eradicated in such way. If the period of serving will be reduced even to 1 month, then draftees who have served more than 2 weeks will scoff at draftees who served less than 2 weeks. By the way, it’s no coincidence that classrooms for first grades and senior grades are always placed in schools separately; it’s even advisable to place them onto different floors in order to restrict access. The problems are the same. So, it’s necessary to change the whole system. But there are some people who try to impede progress. 

About So-Called Experts as Representatives of the Intellectual Elite of Russia

         There are many self-appointed experts and professionals who appeared in Russia during the current decade. These people like discussing social-economic and political problems with a knowledgeable air. Generally, they are concentrated at so-called “Centers” or “Institutes” which are grown by leaps and bounds, specialize in systems analysis supposedly and usually consist of several average men (sometimes with academic degrees) who like to be hip to the latest world news and immediately react to them by their dilettantish comments. Numerous reputable-looking research papers and experts’ reports which are abound in irrelevant nitty-gritty details regularly come into being in the depths of such organizations under the high-sounding titles. Content of these research papers is as clear as day, but is plenty of pseudo-scientific words and therefore they are presented in an unintelligible form.

 

Short Review of the Opposition in Russia

          Short review of the present public policy in Russia will allow us to allocate the following representations about political structures which can be considered as an opposition.

          1) The official point of view is supported by mass media and wide range of experts and political scientists loyal to the ruling top. In accordance with this conception there are:

• intrasystem opposition presented at the Parliament by fractions of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and Just (or Fair) Russia;
  
  
• extraparliamentary intersystem opposition which includes all parties registered by the Ministry of Justice;
  
  
• non-systemic opposition consisting of not registered movements (Another Russia, National Assembly, United Civil Front, Solidarity, the Russian People's Democratic Union, the Left Front etc.)

          2) In accordance with the independent point of view registered parties cannot be oppositional at all. Any public association wih real signs of disloyality will be eliminated at the stage of registration and, of course, cannot be admitted to elections.

          First of all, we need to understand if one could consider the intrasystem opposition as a real opposition. For this purpose it’s required to analyse activity of parliamentary parties.

Opposition in Russia: not the Ghost of a Chance

Opposition is an organized group of persons that are united to oppose a government.

          

Efficiency of any oppositional organization is determined by successfulness of its only possible primary objective achieving – coming to a power in a democratic way to realize its own political program.

          

We can estimate efficiency of any oppositional organization by using three indicators. First, it is the level of public support of an organization. If public support is absent, it is convenient to explain such fact by counteraction of “a bloody regime”. Many leaders of current Russian opposition mask their unpopularity in such way especially in front of their sponsors abroad. Organizations headed by these people have the only possible objective - just to recept a next grant from an international NGO. Russian oppositional organizations habitually mislead foreign grantors by submitting falce reports about uncompromising activity in the area of freedom distribution and human rights protection. Such quasioppositional organizations consist of several tens of persons at best and are usually headed by public figures and former officials of 1990th years or even by inveterate liberals which are named by the people of Russia as “demschiza” (it means “democratic schizophrenic”). Their total approval rating is about 3-5 percent at best. An analysis of reasons why it has occurred is not a goal of this article. Now it is just necessary to realize fully that Russian people distrust the opposition. This fact should be taken into consideration by grantors, especially by international NGOs, because their money probably will be frittered away or even plundered.

The Constructive Project Foundation was established in Moscow

The Meeting of Founders of the Constructive Project Foundation took place in Moscow on November 13, 2009. The Meeting unanimously approved the Charter and elected the Management Board and the Board of Trustees of the Foundation.

The Meeting also approved the Phoenix as an emblem of the organization. This is a mythical bird with bright red and fiery plumage. A phoenix is usually represented in heraldry rising of a flame because it possesses ability to rise from the ashes. Such symbol of eternal renewal is especially topical for our disintegrated and vandalized country. Considering national specificity we have combined an image of the Phoenix with an image of a Firebird, the character of Russian national fairy tales, whose singing cures patients and returns sight to the blind. Russian society is affected by blindness and passivity indeed. An extreme individualization, unwillingness of everyone to defend even his own interests, unavailability to self-organizing and collective actions, self-isolation, unwillingness to take notice of obvious things and mortal fear of a state power are now typical for the Russians. 

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