Short review of the present public policy in Russia will allow us to allocate the following representations about political structures which can be considered as an opposition.
1) The official point of view is supported by mass media and wide range of experts and political scientists loyal to the ruling top. In accordance with this conception there are:
- intrasystem opposition presented at the Parliament by fractions of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and Just (or Fair) Russia;
- extraparliamentary intersystem opposition which includes all parties registered by the Ministry of Justice;
- non-systemic opposition consisting of not registered movements (Another Russia, National Assembly, United Civil Front, Solidarity, the Russian People's Democratic Union, the Left Front etc.)
2) In accordance with the independent point of view registered parties cannot be oppositional at all. Any public association wih real signs of disloyality will be eliminated at the stage of registration and, of course, cannot be admitted to elections.
First of all, we need to understand if one could consider the intrasystem opposition as a real opposition. For this purpose it’s required to analyse activity of parliamentary parties.
The Communist Party of the Russian Federation has been created in February, 1993 as the restored Communist Party of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic. There were lasting assumptions that this initiative was privately supported by the state because the Communist Party had been forbidden earlier by the decree of President Yeltsin. Proceeding from this point of view it is easy to explain the muffled position and inactivity of the Central Committee of the CPRF during armed revolt against Boris Yeltsin in October, 1993. This position had facilitated the suppression of revolt by army. Participation of the CPRF in various elections in 1993-1999, including presidential elections, actually legitimized the new Constitution of the Russian Federation which was adopted by national referendum on 12th December, 1993. Inability of Gennady Zyuganov, the head of the CPRF, to achieve a victory in the second round of 1996 presidential elections, when it was more difficult to lose than to win, only confirms the loyalty of the top of this party to the power.
In general, political activity of the CPRF was always characterised by absence of any resolute actions essentially contradicting a position of the regime. The party had never masked its readiness for haggling before voting for or against any decision which was important for the ruling top. Continued compromises and attempts to keep the status quo were masked by loud and unproductive actions of public protest and disadvantageous initiatives of vote of no confidence to the Government (1997) or impeachment of the President (1999). With the lapse of time it became obvious that for the Communist Party led by Zyuganov it was more important to keep positions reached earlier than to get something new. Loss of the leading parliamentary fraction status after 1999 parliamentary elections and degradation to the parliamentary minority was a consequence of this passive course.
The potential of the CRPF steadily weakened year by year. It is proven by results of various regional and federal elections. Throughout all these years the head of the CPRF regularly put obstacles in the way of any attempts of the party management rotation and modernisation of its organizational structure, ideology and activity methods because of fear to lose his status and priviledge. Inner-party scandals have started to shake the party and a lot of well-known members of the CPRF which were not consent with Zyuganov have been excluded from the party or left it themselves. Devastating defeats of the CPRF in 2007 parliamentary elections and in 2004 and 2008 presidential elections had logically continued the process of the party’s decomposition.
Now the CPRF (to be more precise, its remainder) is continuing to declare loudly that it is still oppositional to the regime. At the same time, the party has impressive financing from this regime. According to the report of the Central Controlling and Auditing Commission of the CPRF at 13th Congress of the party, the total sum of receipts during 10 months of 2008 was about $ 6,000,000. About $ 300,000 of them were membership fees, about $ 1,500,000 were donations and $ 4,300,000 was financing from the federal budget. It means, that oppositional activity of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation is financed on 70 % by the regime.
So the answer to the question “Is the Communist Party of the Russian Federation really oppositional?” is obvious.
LDPR was created in February, 1989 as Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union. The real ideological program of the party obviously mismatches neither to liberalism principles, nor bases of liberal democracy. It is difficult to find any political scientist who would sincerely believe that LDPR is oppositional party (though all time of its existence this party had been positioning itself as irreconcilable opposition). The real role of the party is consisted in neutralisation of any influence of the most marginal protest electorate in parliamentary and presidential elections. Thereupon it is inappropriate to answer the question “Is the LDPR a real opposition in Russia?”.
Party Just Russia has been formed in October, 2006 by merge of three prokremlin parties – Motherland (Rodina), the Russian Pensioners’ Party and the Russian Party of Life. Considering the direct participation in creation of the incorporated party of the Administration of the President of Russia, nobody believes to a disloyalty of this party to Kremlin. But Just Russia also declares that it is oppositional (inspite of the fact that its leader is the Head of the Upper Chamber of the Parliament).
Party Right Cause has been formed in November, 2008 by the same method as Just Russia - association of three prokremlin parties (the Union of Right Forces, Democratic Party of Russia and Civilian Power). The control over this process from the Administration of the President of Russia was not disappeared at all.
The Russian United Democratic Party Yabloko (Apple) was most consistent on the right flank. Since 1993 this party positioned itself as the oppositional. Its leader Grigory Javlinsky repeatedly made critical statements against the Government and the regime at all. In 1993-2004 fraction of Yabloko was presented at the Lower Chamber of the Parliament, however, Yabloko always remained to be a small party. Its resources were insufficient to change the status quo. Another problem for a long time was the inability for political cooperation of heads of the party, and this didn’t allow them to unite even with ideologically close structures (for example, the Union of Right Forces before its breaking up).
Yabloko never had possibility to have an influence on taking strategic and important decisions in Russia. Therefore the only variant for the party was the position of demonstrative expression of non-agreement on any matter with the regime, but the purpose of such actions was only to attract public attention, and results of these attempts were unsuccessful. Thus leaders of Yabloko regularly refused to delegate members of the party to the Government and Javlinsky himself figured, probably, only on the post of the Prime Minister, not lower. As a result Mikhail Zadornov and Oksana Dmitrieva who have agreed to become members of the Government ceased to be members of the party.
This strategy run into trouble. There had been created an impression about inability of the party to participate in the Government and to realise its own program. This has pushed away a lot of voters and made some people to stop their membership of the party. Therefore in 1999 leaders of Yabloko have decided to involve ex-Prime Minister Sergey Stepashin in the candidate lists on elections to the State Duma (the lower house of the Russian Parliament) and also to include in it some politicians with administrative experience of regional level. However it has not rescued Yabloko from double reduction of parliamentary fraction and subsequent defeat of the party leader in 2000 presidential elections. In 2000-2001 Yabloko endured organizational crisis: some famous parliamentary figures and regional activists left the party and it lost support of leading sponsors. After the power change of the top management of NTV channel Yabloko was practically cut off from mass-media. In these conditions leaders of Yabloko have decided to change strategy and start to show their loyalty to the ruling top of the regime. However the regime did not require services of Yabloko and without any hesitation had arrested the main sponsor of the party - billionaire Michael Khodorkovsky, the then head of Yukos Oil Company, whose people stood under lists of parliamentary kandidates of Yabloko. This situation caused failure of Yabloko in 2003 parliamentary elections. Refusal of the party to propose its candidate in 2004 and 2008 presidential elections and failures in regional elections mean exhaustion of Yabloko’s potential. Its attempt to return to strategy of principled opposition was carried out desperately and inconsistently - otherwise nobody would know about constant informal consultations with the ruling top of the regime, and there also would not be a refusal to participate in an oppositional coalition. All these meant the political death of party which was proved by its failure in 2007 parliamentary elections. Definitive decline of the party has been accelerated by its own leaders which have selected passive tactics. In places where Yabloko showed activity, possessed authority and influence (St.-Petersburg, Republic of Kareliya etc.), the regional branches of the party were excluded from participation in elections by the regime. For this reason number of activists of the party was steadily reduced, its presence in mass-media was minimised, and financial resources ran low. By 2009 process of slow decomposition of Yabloko has got irreversible character, and it was not stopped even by resignation of the party leader Grigory Javlinsky. All these mean the absence of chances to come to power and actual senselessness of further existence of the party as an oppositional organization.
The situation with the non-systemic opposition is more difficult. But only at first sight.
In February, 2005 the former Prime Minister of Russia Mikhail Kasyanov made some statements with public criticism of the regime and declared his transition in opposition. He has accused the ruling top of the regime of dismantle of democratic bases of the constitutional system (cancellation of direct elections of governors); an interdiction to participate in the parliamentary elections for public associations, except parties; increasing a minimum barrier on parliamentary elections to 7 percent). Also Kasyanov has declared that there was no division of authorities, independent judicial system, freedom of mass-media and private property protection in Russia. These statements have forced observers to say that Kasyanov adjoined liberal opposition and can represent himself as the leader of united democratic opposition in 2008 presidential election. Probably, Kasyanov assumed to get support of the ruling circles of the USA as it was done by the ex-Prime Minister of Ukraine Victor Yushchenko, and to unite all oppositional organizations in Russia around himself. After the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (and in Serbia and Georgia before) this plan seemed to be enough real to frighten the Kremlin and to compel it to take preventive measures. Having played on an advancing, the Administration of the President of Russia at the last minute actually could take out from Kasyanov the control under the Democratic Party of Russia which he decided to pull out from a non-existence and to head in 2005. Activists of Prokremlin youth movements Nashi, Young Guard of the United Russia and Young Russia started to pursue Kasyanov during his trips all over the country and wreck meetings with voters. Besides, his access to the most of mass-media was completely blocked.
In July, 2005 the deputy of the Lower Chamber of the Parliament Alexander Hinstein made statements with charges against Kasyanov. As Hinstein said, when Kasyanov still was the Prime Minister, he had received for an undercharge the former state summer residence of a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU Mikhail Suslov.
The materials published by Hinstein were used by the Office of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation as an occasion of institution of legal proceedings under the 3rd part of 165th article of the Criminal Code («causing of a property damage in especially large size by a deceit or breach of confidence»). News about this case was appeared when the ex-Prime Minister had been stayed abroad. The ruling top of the regime probably assumed that Kasyanov will not return to Russia because of being afraid of criminal prosecution. Such situation was before arrest of the head of Yukos Oil Company Mikhail Khodorkovsky in 2003. However Kasyanov arrived back believing that he had designated himself as the candidate in 2008 presidential elections and this will provide him guarantees from repressive sanctions. Nevertheless the summer residence finally had been taken away by the regime after a long litigation.
The campaign started against Kasyanov in state mass-media and constant use of the nickname «Misha Two Percent» which ostensibly belonges to him (it means that when Kasyanov held power and ostensibly participated in corruption schemes he took to himself 2 percent from the sum-total) had sharply lowered his rating which was already low enough at that time. It meant that Kasyanov had no serious support from the USA of the EU - otherwise he would precisely have proper resources to oppose the regime in mass-media. Probably he planned to get support during his oppositional activity, reasonably believing that his status of the ex-Prime Minister of Russia will automatically unite around him all non-systemic opposition from right and probably left flanks. If it would have occurred Kasyanov really might become the only leader of the opposition and certain ruling circles of the USA which were dissatisfied with the defiant foreign policy and provocative statements of the Russian regime could count on such new democratic leader. However Kasyanov had obviously overestimated adequacy of leaders of small oppositional organizations in Russia. Each of them understood the supremacy of Kasyanov but everyone wished not to appreciate it and even did not want to work together with so status politician. This situation might be broken only by interference of foreign grantors. If they would emphasize that they want to unite Russian opposition around Kasyanov then the coalition might be developed quickly. However this had not been occurred and it meant that Kasyanov actually made a false start, got under the fire of the regime and lost all real chances to return to the power.
Nevertheless, in April, 2006 Kasyanov created and headed his own social movement the People's Democratic Union (PDU). Personnel problems have arisen practically from the beginning of the PDU activity. First of all, political opportunists began to enter into the movement, believing that Americans have decided to organize Russian Orange Revolution led by Kasyanov. These inadequate people who simultaneosly were members of many diminutive oppositional structures (United Civil Front, Oborona, We, Moscow Branches of the Union of Right Forces and Yabloko etc.), have decided that they can drive to the Kremlin on the general wave without putting their own efforts. Some of them have even been recruited by Russian security services. A relevant notification had appeared in particular at the forum of the website of the social movement Oborona (Defence). A user under the pseudonym «Golyshev» informed others about the Co-ordinator of the movement Oleg K. (that man was illegally recruited to the Russian Army in December, 2007 and spent there for several months): «I know Oleg very well. He is an informer of a state security service, but recently he has sworn with his previous curator. And it was offered to K. to make a choice: he publicly scorches himself as the informer or takes himself away into the Army. He has chosen the Army. … If one do not trust, I will soon upload the salary sheet of K. He received payment through M. [the then leader of the People's Democratic Union of Youth and the Co-ordinator of the movement Oborona, and a current member of the Presidium of the PDU and the Bureau of the Solidarity)] 1200 a month. K. had been paid for data about NBP [Eduard Limonov's National Bolshevic Party] and so forth, for leaking oppositional actions. He had been paid by agents of FSB [the Federal Security Service], but not directly, through M. By the way, she even screwed with a colonel from the Constitutional System Defense Department [of the FSB]».
Certainly, it was not excluded that it was a provocation, however such provocation was similar to reality. In February, 2009 the Branch of the much talked-about movement Oborona in the city of St.-Petersburg has unmasked a secret-service network which was operating for many years in the opposition ranks).
Anna Bukovskaja, the former activist of the Prokremlin youth movement Nashi (Ours), publicly declared that she had supervised the Project «Messenger of the President». In accordance with it several activists of the movement secretly penetrated the United Civil Front, Oborona, the youth organization of Yabloko, Eduard Limonov's National Bolshevic Party and other oppositional movements. According to statements of persons who have declared that they were such agents, paid informants worked in several cities, ordinary agents monthly received for leaking information about $ 800, curators - apprx. $ 1,600. Reconnaisance data had been submitted to consideration of Vladislav Surkov, the First Deputy Head of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation.
Considering this, it is necessary to recognize that suspicions of the regime’s agents presence in the PDU and other oppositional organizations are substantiated. However, this is not even the basic personnel problem in the PDU. The main problem is that there are no professionals among participants of the movement which would be capable to provide high-grade carrying out of an election campaign. Activists of the PDU are generally not well grounded in jurisprudence and their organizing abilities can not even be compared with the level of foreign oppositionists which have won during velvet revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine. And one could observe unwillingness of Russian oppositionist to raise their level of grounding. For example, during attempts to organize seminars on various aspects of pre-election work (including propaganda activity) there were practically empty audiences and invited experts were perplexed because they couldn’t understand whom should they train. The active of the PDU which is basically consist of members of dwarfish liberal and left radical oppositional organizations, preferred a drinking bout at the expence of the PDU to seminars and round tables.
In July, 2006 the PDU entered into a coalition the Other Russia with the liberal non-systemyc oppositionists - United Civil Front, youth movement Oborona, movement For Human Rights of Lev Ponomarev, little-known youth organization Smena (Change), ultraleft and radical Labour Russia of Victor Anpilov and Avant-guard of Red Youth (АКМ). The coalition organized three large public protest actions called Marches of Dissent which were severely dispersed by special policy groups (OMON) in Petersburg and Moscow. However attempts of working out of the general ideological platform and the coordination of the united candidate in 2008 presidential elections have failed. In July, 2007 Kasyanov declared that the Other Russia was terminated as an oppositional coalition, and, thereby, about withdrawal of the PDU from it. This has occurred when negotiations between Kasyanov and Garry Kasparov about Kasyanov's promotion as the united candidate definitively were at a deadlock, though Eduard Limonov had already publicly supported Kasyanov's nominee. As a result the Russian opposition proved its inability to unite once again and a united candidate for president had not been put forward.
Approximately at the same time under persevering requests of participants of the PDU Kasyanov agreed to organize a new party on the basis of the PDU. In July, 2007 constituent congress of the People for Democracy and Justice had taken place, but the party was not officially registered, as, however, the PDU itself.
When presidential election campaign has begun, Kasyanov independently nominated himself to elections and presented to the Central Election Commission of Russia more than 2 million signatures of voters for his support. However the CEC refused the ex-Prime Minister of Russia an official registration as a candidate under a formal pretence that there were technical errors in execution of subscription lists and this allowed the CEC to define more than 5 percent of signatures as void. In February, 2008 Kasyanov unsuccessfully appealed to the Supreme Court. It is remarkable, that even being the united candidate from non-systemic opposition in fact, he did not not receive any support from his former allies from the former coalition the Other Russia.
Mikhail Kasyanov continues oppositional activity today, probably by inertia, though he may understand that he had lost chances of coming to power because he will never unite any opposition around himself. But finishing of his activity would mean a definitive recognition of his defeat and for this reason the activity is still conducted.
Other oppositionists also continue their “unequal struggle against the regime” and activity of Garry Kasparov’s organizations is most appreciable.
In 2005 he created and headed the UCF which was positioned as a liberal democratic opposition. In 2006 the UCF entered into the Other Russia coalition, having noted by participation in the organization of Marches of Dissent. After breakdown of the coalition the UCF won nothing, though Kasparov formally could consider himself to be a winner in the interstine struggle against Kasyanov (who compelled to keep separate from the former allies as a result). On a field of struggle against the ruling top of the regime Kasparov achieved nothing to wright home about, and probably he decided that the problem is that the quantity of organizations which he heads is insufficient. For this reason, after some months of unsuccessful attempts to start procedure of his promotion to become a candidate in 2008 presidential elections Kasparov decided to create so-called National Assembly (NA). It was positioned as protoparliament so its members were called as deputies (there were registered in July, 5th, 2008 not less than 683 deputies from all the same organizations which remained in the former Other Russia).
After a year of the NA existence the writer Jury Mukhin, a member of the Council of the NA, declared the following:
«Under impression of the expanded [session] of the Council of the Assembly in May, 30th [2009] and a year of existence of the Assembly I should speak on our main problem - inability to direct.
My conclusion is obliged to cause huge bewilderment of deputies, and more likely, aversion and negation of my foolish thing in general – what, we are not able to direct?! And those who were deputies of the Congress of People’s Deputies in the late eighties, or deputies of the State Duma of all convocations till present time - are they cleverer than we, better than we? Things are even worse: not they are cleverer and better than we, but we are not better than they. And Russia will win nothing from their replacement by us – it will be even worse for Russia because of our brainless governance, and to be more precise, our honesty which is still declared by remained deputies will not replace an ability to direct. Good guy is not a profession.
As follows from condition of today's Russia, it is governed by people such as we. The fact that we are improper leaders and our imperious ambitions are even not funny is proved by huge term of existence of our Assembly - the whole year during which we did not even made anything useful for Russia, did not spread influence among the people, but lost two hundreds deputies as deserters without fight.
Therefore the fact that rats are deserting our ship, says not only that they are exactly rats, but also that the ship is full of holes and is doomed to sink. Clever captain should be disturbed by this phenomenon.
From the point of view of an administrator, there was so much children's naive absurd from hoary with age people during the Council session, that I simply do not wish to reproduce it, because so many people have already taken offence at my sharp words. And again one young man suffered a question - who are we? Protoparliament? It’s necessary to explain once again, that we are the fair people of Russia who promised Russia and each other to achieve for Russia:
- discharge of all political prisoners;
- dissolution of all illegitimate bodies, including the State Duma;
- carrying out of general and free competitive elections with participation of all existing political parties and organizations;
- formation of bodies of national representation and executive bodies which shall be responsible before the Russian people and carry out a will of Russian citizens;
- fair distribution of the national goods created by free people;
- transformation of Russia into a legal, democratic and secular federal republic.
And for a year of our pitiful existence we even have not tried to start realization of at least some of these aims. More truly, we accepted a statement about the Law for Responsibility of the Power, so it seemed we made something. However, a part of deputies furiously voted against this Law, nothing offering in exchange (from the point of view of management … such "leaders" are usually kicked out because subtilizing talkers are not wanted in any real business). But the sufficient part of deputies who voted pro did not understand for what reason they had voted, and such kind of voting is even worse! Because those who voted against thought about the essence of this Law (though incorrectly) and those who thoughtlessly voted pro are “representative trash” (from the point of view of the administrator) under cover of which any villain will be able to do everything. As well as today villains in Russia may do everything under cover of voting pro “representative trash” of the State Duma.
What the hell! What kind of power of 140-millioned Russia can we be, if we are not able to organize activity of 700 persons – ourselves? If we are not only incapable of developing the plan of achievement of our own declared aims, but also not able to understand and discuss any available plan? Are we leisure talkers? Yes, we are! Are we street demonstrators and picketers? Yes, we are! But we are not a power at all! Do not make people laugh!
Experience lays at the heart of a successful people management till now! Experience!! And an experience is a work, and the more work, the more experience it is. As for us, the overwhelming number of deputies is guided by a principle - we hadn’t yet worked as deputies and no one will force us to work! In this case, from where will you get an experience? It is not a work to vote on command, even a donkey is capable to do this without problems. Well, what’s the point in our mulish trying to rule Russia?! »
Besides, Jury Mukhin confirmed in same article that the National Assembly is financed and supervised by Kasparov: «… How someone can influence by money, for example, on Kasparov, who finances the Assembly himself?»
In 2008 the UCF also acted as one of initiators of formation of the social movement named Solidarity. Political scientist Boris Kagarlitsky declared the following about this movement:
«Usually politicians use another's slogans and another's images when they not dare to state theirs own or when they do not have theirs own. As a matter of fact, an idea of solidarity is a history and tradition of a movement of working-class. Therefore it is clear when trade unions name themselves as Solidarity. … A solidarity is not liberal, but antiliberal idea. It is a slogan in the name of which people unite for struggle against liberalism. Therefore it is very comical when liberals use this name. And democrats perfectly understand it. But if they do not understand what it signifies, this means that they don’t know elements of political theory and have no representation about history and politics. What conclusion is more suitable? The conclusion that these people generally understand nothing and are totally incompetent and illiterate, or that they play the hypocrite».
The fact, that the Executive Director of the UCF Denis Bilunov was appointed as the Executive Director of Solidarity confirms that these organizations are obviously affiliated. Many of members and activists of the UCF are members and activists of Solidarity at the same time (finally, they are included in the National Assembly, the Other Russia, etc.).
The Solidarity is positioned as an association of democratic opposition which came true at last. This has caused sharply negative reaction of Yabloko which full name is the Russian United Democratic Party Yabloko (it means that it is an association of all democratic opposition too). So it made statements, in particular, that the Solidarity:
- is based on sights of ideologists and executors of the policy of 1990th;
- did not accurately express a negative attitude to results of the policy of 1990th;
- is created by politicians involved in corruption in 1990th when they were at power;
- has non-transparent financing.
However until the Russian opposition will not offer a program which would consider interests of not only a business, but also of all social classes, nobody will follow their leaders, many of which have compromized themselves in 1990th. There are serious doubts that the Solidarity will be able to make something like this, because no one of Kasparov’s organizations was able to do it, and there are no reasons and conditions which would allow a next cloned movement to achieve such goal. Any prospects of the Solidarity are absent, though as Russian people’s attitude to the regime will worsen because of the financial crisis, but it is not excluded that rating of the movement will rise to several tenth shares of a percent. It is not capable to influence on the population strongly for one simple reason: its key figures are all from the past. And the past accurately associates among Russian people with disappointment that has occurred in 1990th years. Therefore the Solidarity still occupies a very narrow and limited niche of a street liberal movement.
As for the ultraleft radicals, they are presented by the National Bolshevic Party of Eduard Limonov, so-called Left Front which consists of activists of the Avant-Guard of Red Youth and smaller little-known organizations which are included to the Other Russia. These organizations have not enough resources, and now they are hardly capable to offer to the society something more than loud protest actions on the verge of hooliganism under populist slogans. Their positioning quite keeps within frameworks of marginal niche which is far from any serious victories at politics.
Thus, the short analysis of the current opposition in Russia obviously shows, that it is not capable to come to power independently under any conditions. But possible foreign support (for example, from the USA) to any of these organizations would not result in something useful, except a lot of hot air. Western grantors hardly need it, especially in conditions of the world financial crisis. So it is necessary to put on the agenda the question of revision of the existing system of support of Russian NGOs. This question means refusal of financing and deprivation of political support of liberal and democratic opposition headed by persons conducting not productive activity. But such refusal actually means termination of the current opposition. Are responsible persons who take decisions abroad ready for such step? Are they ready to start from scratch?
If they need a result instead of imitation of activity - this is the only way for them and they are simply obliged to do it as soon as possible.
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